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The belief theory of prejudice suggests that 
prejudice results from an aversion toward in-
dividuals who hold beliefs which are incon-
gruent with one’s own. It was postulated that 
the aversion toward incompatible beliefs was 
due to universal needs for consensual valida-
tion (Rokeach, Smith, & Evans, 1960) and/or 
the desire for the reinforcement provided by 
belief agreement (Byrne & Wong, 1962). Fur-
thermore, belief theory proponents have sug-
gested that without anticipations about be-
lief differences, no prejudice would exist. 
Rokeach et al. (1960), in elaborating that point in 
the original formal presentation of the belief the-
ory, asked and answered the ultimate question: 
Are there two qualitatively different kinds of prejudice, 
or can racial and ethnic prejudice be subsumed under 
belief prejudice? The data, such as they are, seem to 
yield up a primarily no answer to the fi rst part, and pri-
marily yes answer to the second part of the question 
[p. 157]. 
Since that statement, a good many other re-
searchers have interpreted their research as sup-
porting those notions. 
The purposes of this paper are several: First, 
to demonstrate that the question of race versus 
belief cannot be answered in the abstract, and 
that any attempt at a quantitative answer to the 
question of the relative strength of race and be-
lief differences in determining prejudice is in-
appropriate. In order to develop the argument 
leading to that conclusion, a review of the lit-
erature supporting the belief theory will be pre-
sented, discussed, and criticized. The second 
purpose of this paper is to show that the inter-
action of belief differences and race are quite 
complex and that a reformulation of the belief 
theory in terms of mutual causal relations be-
tween racial prejudice and beliefs (rather than 
the unidirectional relation presently in vogue) is 
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more appropriate. Evidence in the form of data 
from two studies will be presented to demon-
strate that race prejudice can exist regardless of 
belief differences, and that a more complex for-
mulation than the belief theory is indicated. 
BELIEF THEORY RESEARCH
In the initial belief theory research of 
Rokeach et al. (1960), stimulus individuals 
were presented in a factorial design of Race × 
Belief, so that the stimulus persons were pre-
sented as (a) Negro person who agrees; (b) Ne-
gro person who disagrees; (c) white person who 
agrees; (d) white person who disagrees. Agree-
ment was manipulated by the stimulus person’s 
stand on some one topic, so that most stimulus 
person presentations were as short as “ A Ne-
gro who believes in God.” Topics were both 
general and race relevant, including socialized 
medicine, communism, labor unions, God, im-
mediate desegregation, fraternity and sorori-
ty integration, equality of race, and integration 
of neighborhoods. Prejudice was determined on 
the basis of the subject’s responses to a 9-point 
social-distance-type scale concerning potential 
friendship. Using a factorial design of Race × 
Agreement (Belief), the data indicated that the 
basic hypothesis concerning the greater power 
of the belief manipulation was correct. 
Almost identical stimulus person presenta-
tion methods were used by Smith, Williams, 
and Willis (1967) with subject populations dif-
ferent in location and age from those of the 
Rokeach research. Their fi ndings generally 
tended to replicate the Rokeach fi ndings, al-
though a high degree of racial (as opposed to 
belief) discrimination was found for the Lou-
isiana subject sample. There were, however, 
several signifi cant problems with the research. 
The questionnaire was undisguised so that it 
was completely obvious to subjects that race 
and belief issues were being studied and that 
their responses would indicate both their atti-
tudes toward the belief issues and toward race. 
Results must be interpreted, therefore, with the 
recognition of the confounding of social desir-
ability with racial prejudice mediated by the 
obvious demand characteristics of the situa-
tion. Second, in this rather artifi cial, situation, 
subjects must make some decisions as to what 
the experimenter means to imply by his stim-
ulus materials. Does the mention of one man 
as Negro and another as white imply that all 
other things are equal between the two ? Al-
though a subject could blithely develop and 
accept such a premise in the context of psy-
chological research, he might never be will-
ing to concede the same point in real-life ra-
cial interactions. This objection also concerns 
the question of whether the laboratory presen-
tation of race-relevant materials results in sub-
jects believing the experimenter. Suspicious-
ness checks have been conspicuously absent 
from the bulk of the cited research. One does 
not read any reports of such direct questions 
as “Did you think we were looking at the in-
fl uence of race on your responses ?” A rare re-
ported occurrence of a check of any sort (Hen-
drick, Bixenstine, & Hawkins, 1971) asked 
subjects “to describe their reactions to the ex-
periment.” Work on postexperimental ques-
tionnaire procedures for deception experi-
ments has suggested the advantages of direct 
and specifi c questions following more gener-
al ones as an ideal technique for detecting true 
suspicions: without eliciting false-positive re-
ports (Page, 1971). Whether we consider the 
possibility of mistaken assumptions on the part 
of the subjects, or their possible suspicious-
ness of the experimenter’s true intent, there is 
cause for serious doubt that subjects respond 
to the stimulus materials in a manner which is 
similar to their real-life behavior. 
A second category of objection to the 
Rokeach et al. (1960) and Smith et al. (1967) 
studies was explicated by the research of Tri-
andis and Davis (1965). Using stimulus person 
presentation techniques similar to the Rokeach 
et al. (1960) method, those authors presented 
to each of 300 subjects eight stimulus persons 
representing all combinations of race (white or 
Negro), sex, and strong pro or anti views to-
ward civil rights. Stimulus persons were de-
scribed in short phrases such as “Male, Negro, 
favors strong civil rights legislation.” Depen-
dent measures of semantic differential and so-
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cial-distance-like behavioral differential scales 
were used. From previously determined factor 
structures (Triandis, 1964), the behavioral dif-
ferential scales were classifi ed into the fi ve fac-
tors of formal social acceptance, friendship ac-
ceptance, marital acceptance, social distance, 
and subordination. For the fi rst two factors, be-
lief differences provided the greatest infl uence, 
while sex and race had the most impact on the 
third, and the last two were most infl uenced by 
race. These results were interpreted as suggest-
ing that the dependent measures used determine 
the relative infl uence of the race versus belief 
infl uence. Other research (Dienstbier, 1970) ex-
tended those fi ndings. For the same subjects, 
while favoritism may be indicated toward mi-
nority group members (over whites) on one 
scale such as “would elect to political offi ce,” 
signifi cant negative prejudice may still be indi-
cated on other more race-sensitive scales such 
as “accept as kin by marriage.” Mezei (1971) 
has since suggested that the greater infl uence 
of race on such items as marriage acceptance 
is merely due to subjects’ anticipation of social 
disapproval for a more lenient stand. The Mezei 
data are, unfortunately, not free from the alter-
native interpretation that race prejudice is very 
real, and that subjects see other people as shar-
ing their prejudice in order to defend their own 
views and because (as the belief theory sug-
gests) they want to believe that others largely 
share their beliefs and values. At present, then, 
it appears that certain dependent measures are 
far more responsive to racial prejudice while 
others are more belief sensitive. The friendship 
acceptance scales of the Rokeach et al. (1960) 
and the Smith et al. (1967) research and the 
choice of work partner scales used in Byrne’s 
research (reviewed below) are far more suscep-
tible to belief than race infl uences (Dienstbier, 
1970; Triandis, 1961; Triandis & Davis, 1965). 
Their use, therefore, biases results toward con-
fi rmation of the belief theory. 
Using a different stimulus person presenta-
tion technique, Byrne and Wong (1962) pre-
sented stimulus persons through a 26-item 
checklist of attitudes, with the valence of the 
attitudes of the stimulus persons having been 
derived from previously acquired self-reports 
of the subjects on those same attitudes. The 
stimulus persons’ attitude checklists were con-
structed so that attitudes were like those of the 
individual subject (all responses to each item 
on the same side of the 6-point scale, but not 
necessarily in the same exact scale position 
as chosen by the subject), or unlike those of 
the subject. The checklist “of attitudes devel-
oped by Byrne concerned such topics as mar-
riage, entertainment, religion, politics, drink-
ing, and a Catholic president; the items do not, 
according to Byrne and Wong, “refl ect com-
mon elements in the Negro stereotype.” Anal-
ysis of the factorial design of two levels of 
subject prejudice by two levels of race (Negro 
and white) by two levels of agreement (belief) 
found agreement to be the greatest source of 
variance on the dependent measures-choice of 
work partner and personal feeling scales. 
In subsequent related research by By-
rne and McGraw (1964), Stein, Hardyck, and 
Smith (1965), Stein (1966), Insko and Robin-
son (1967), and Robinson and Insko (1969), the 
attitude checklist belief manipulation method 
was elaborated and applied to different subject 
populations, in some cases with the addition of 
such factors as age and, religious differences 
attributed to the stimulus individuals. The By-
rne and McGraw (1964) research used the same 
checklist of attitude manipulations of belief as 
the previous Byrne research. Stein et al. (1965) 
and Stein (1966) used a teenager questionnaire 
of about 2–5 items, a few of which were rele-
vant to stereotypes of blacks (concerning intel-
ligence, morality, ambition, and dancing abili-
ty). Insko and Robinson (1967) and Robinson 
and Insko (1969) used many of the same belief 
manipulation items of Stein’s research, adding 
several items taken from the Blake and Dennis 
(1943) study on Negro stereotypes. Robinson 
and Insko (1969) provided a clever refi nement 
on the practice of making the dissimilar check-
list by fi lling out the stimulus person’s checklist 
with items scored opposite from the subject’s. 
Their method involved fi nding what the sub-
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ject’s estimates of the typical black’s attitudes, 
and returning that profi le back to the subject 
later, attributed once to a white and once to a 
black individual. Although these studies gener-
ally attempted to disguise the true nature of the 
research by suggesting to the subjects that the 
stimulus individuals were real people, the atti-
tude checklist technique still suffers under the 
obvious limitation of being quite artifi cial, so 
that applicability of results to behavior in non-
laboratory situations is quite limited. 
These studies conceptualized and operation-
alized prejudice in a variety of ways. Although 
Byrne and McGraw (1964) used only the choice 
of friendship and work partner measures of the 
previous Byrne research, the research of Stein 
(1966) and Stein et al. (1965) used social-dis-
tance-type measures which ranged into such 
race-sensitive areas as acceptance as kin by 
marriage. The dependent measures of Insko 
and Robinson (1967) and Robinson and Insko 
(1969) included both semantic differential and 
social-distance-type items. 
Generally the Byrne and McGraw (1964) 
research supported the belief theory predic-
tions, as did the Stein et al. (1965) and Stein 
(1966) research (on all prejudice measures ex-
cept that of “accept as kin by marriage” used 
in the Stein et al., 1965, research). The south-
ern samples of the Insko and Robinson (1967) 
and the Robinson and Insko (1969) studies, 
however , indicated a greater degree of race 
than belief prejudice on most of the social-dis-
tance-type measures which were based on Tri-
andis’ behavioral differential factors of friend-
ship acceptance and social distance. Semantic 
differential scales generally indicated great-
er belief than race effects (Insko & Robinson, 
1967; Robinson & Insko, 1969). 
Other experiments, which were designed 
to test the belief theory but which used stim-
ulus person presentation techniques different 
from those described above, did not provide 
uniform support for the belief theory. Trian-
dis (1961) presented stimulus individuals by 
religious, occupational, and racial labels, ask-
ing each subject to imagine the stimulus indi-
vidual to be of the same or different philoso-
phy as the subject. Results did not support the 
belief theory, instead they indicated race to 
be the most important variable in determining 
prejudice on a variety of social distance scales 
(in contrast to similarity of philosophy, reli-
gion, and occupation). In three separate exper-
iments, Rokeach and Mezei (1966) had sub-
jects interact with four confederates, two of 
whom (one white and one Negro) agreed with 
the subject and two of whom disagreed (on 
topics not directly relevant to race or race-ste-
reotype issues). Using the subject’s choice of 
two coffee partners or two work partners as a 
measure of attraction toward the confederates, 
the experimenters were able to determine that 
more choices were made on the basis of ) be-
lief alone than of race alone. Frequent choic-
es of partners in combinations which could not 
be attributed to race or belief similarity, how-
ever, limit the degree to which those results 
can be interpreted as supportive of the be-
lief theory. In a study similar in conception to 
that of Rokeach and Mezei (1966), Hendrick 
et al. (1971) presented subjects with a video-
tape sequence of two whites and two blacks 
discussing the issue of the Vietnam war. Us-
ing measures of felt similarity, liking, and trait 
ratings as prejudice indexes, the authors found 
that the actors’ race had much weaker effects 
than their position on the war issue, conclud-
ing: “The results of the study provide substan-
tial support for the Rokeach et al. theory [p. 
255].” “In fact, race may not be a very impor-
tant variable at all [italics added, p. 257]” in 
determining attraction. The authors note, how-
ever, that those conclusions do not extend to 
such measures as the “date my sister” social 
distance item used in their research (which 
showed large race effects). 
Although the Rokeach and Mezei (1966) 
and Hendrick et al. (1971) studies used mote 
lifelike presentations of the stimulus individu-
als and their communications than did the oth-
er reviewed studies, Rokeach and Mezei (1966) 
used dependent measures which are more sensi-
tive to belief manipulations, as described above, 
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and both studies used communications devoid 
of race-relevant content. With respect to this 
last issue, there is little value in manipulating 
belief issues which have nothing to do with ra-
cial stereotypes and prejudice. If white Amer-
icans feel antipathy toward black Americans 
based on assumptions about the blacks’ beliefs, 
those beliefs will not as likely be beliefs about 
the Vietnam war as about ambition, morality, 
cleanliness, dependability, etc. The race prej-
udice reduction achieved in the several stud-
ies which have used belief issues irrelevant to 
racial prejudice and stereotypes have probably 
achieved that reduction partly because student 
subjects are generally somewhat reluctant to 
make responses which appear prejudiced, part-
ly because their initial level of race prejudice 
might be very low, and partly because they may 
make unwarranted assumptions about the stim-
uli toward which they should respond. 
The differences in fi ndings between re-
searchers using different techniques to manip-
ulate independent variables naturally provide 
the stuff of controversy. Logically, there appear 
to be an unlimited number of ways in which 
either race or belief information could be ma-
nipulated, making dubious the conclusions of 
studies which purport to show that one class 
of variables is more powerful than the other. 
Some researchers in the area have been aware 
of this problem, though such awareness has 
not always been apparent in titles which have 
ranged from “Two kinds of prejudice or one?” 
(Rokeach et al., 1960), and “Race and belief: 
An open and shut case” (Stein et al., 1965), to 
“Race versus belief similarity as determinants 
of attraction : A search for a fair test” (Hen-
drick et al., 1971). Responding to the logical 
demands of the situation, Byrne (see Byrne & 
Irwin, 1969), who had himself once been in 
the thick of the controversy, concluded that the 
question of relative strength could not be mean-
ingfully answered. As indicated in the review 
above, however, the debate was subsequently 
taken up by Hendrick et al. (1971), who con-
cluded that fi nally they had the “fair test,” so 
that “while assessment of relative power is dif-
fi cult, the question is certainly not meaning-
less.” This test was achieved through “approx-
imately equating . . . intuitively” the relative 
strength of the two independent variables. 
ALTERNATE FORMULATIONS 
TO THE BELIEF THEORY
Although the logical problem of the relative 
strength of factorially presented race and be-
lief manipulations is serious, other aspects of 
the belief theory and its Supporting research 
are also weak. The explication of these prob-
lems will be aided by the consideration of a 
more complex view of prejudice presented by 
Allport (1954) six years before the advent of 
the belief theory. Allport defi ned prejudice as 
“an antipathy based upon a faulty and infl ex-
ible generalization.” Within the defi nition it-
self, there is no clue as to the origins of that 
antipathy, but Allport suggested that the bases 
are legion, including fear of strangeness, felt 
needs to justify discriminatory or economic 
practices, various ego-defense needs often as-
sociated with guilt, and ego-defense functions 
of projection and displacement. Often too, 
prejudice was conceived by Allport to result 
from the child simply imitating the antipathies 
of the parents. It is apparent that Allport’s un-
derstanding of prejudice is not completely har-
monious with belief theory notions. Where-
as Allport suggested that the negative beliefs 
about an ethnic group might result from neg-
ative feelings which themselves may exist for 
any number of reasons, Rokeach et al. (1960) 
suggest rather unequivocally that the caus-
al sequence is the opposite—prejudice results 
from perceived belief differences. Thus, while 
the fi rst view sees prejudice as having com-
plex causal roots, with feelings and beliefs be-
ing complexly related in mutually supportive 
relationships, the belief view attempts to ex-
plain prejudice on a far simpler basis and im-
plies a simpler view of man. 
The unidirectional belief theory view of 
“prejudice from anticipated belief differenc-
es” implies that information presented to cor-
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rect belief misconceptions should result in 
prejudice being monotonically reduced. But 
social observation suggests that this may not 
occur. There are numerous examples of mi-
nority populations existing for years within 
majority cultures with no changes in the ma-
jority’s often inaccurate stereotypes. One ex-
ample of this phenomenon is the persistence 
of the myth of Negro male sexual prowess so 
popular in the South (Dollard, 1937). It seems, 
then, that ‘some erroneous beliefs that are the 
cause of racial prejudice (to follow the caus-
al relationships espoused by the belief theo-
ries) are not easily changed by contradictory 
day-to-day evidence. This suggests that these 
beliefs, being especially resistant to change, 
might serve some psychological needs of their 
own that they might result from needs to bol-
ster and justify prejudice (affect) and discrim-
ination which, in turn, might serve a multitude 
of economic, political, personality, and/or so-
cial status needs (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, 
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954). 
The question of which comes fi rst, the affect 
(prejudice) or the cognitive support (stereotype, 
or beliefs about beliefs) is a debatable issue, but 
might best be resolved by admitting to mutual 
causal relationships between the variables, es-
pecially, of course, if those mutual relationships 
can be demonstrated. It is curious that this type 
of controversy develops in modern psychology. 
In the abstract, most of us agree that most psy-
chological processes conceptualized at the level 
of cognition and affect seldom occur in unidi-
rectional causal relationships, but involve in-
stead complex feedback and interaction. Often, 
however, when a theorist demonstrates one side 
of that loop as his area of special interest, he is 
engaged in debate by others who choose to em-
phasize the opposite part of the loop; this either-
or-type debate tends to becloud the issues. To 
return to the specifi c issue, it may, indeed, be 
quite appropriate to suggest that the anticipation 
of belief differences causes prejudice, but if we 
were to stop there, other important and compli-
cating relationships might well be missed. Data 
presented in this paper indicate that prejudice 
causes the anticipation of belief differences. 
That opposite causal relationship does not ne-
gate the belief view; we should visualize a rela-
tionship of mutual infl uence between antipathy 
and expectancies about beliefs. 
A THEORETICAL RESOLUTION
The theoretical position of this paper then, is 
as follows: While research supporting the be-
lief theory indicates that prejudice is based on 
or caused by the anticipation of belief differ-
ences, certain real-life observations and other 
psychological evidence suggest that some oth-
er complicating factors infl uence the dynam-
ics of prejudice. The research reviewed above, 
which has often been cited as providing appar-
ent evidence for the belief theory (Insko, 1967; 
Kirscht & Dillehay, 1967), fails to withstand 
this argument both on the logical grounds expli-
cated above and because certain critical compli-
cating factors, present in real life, have been ab-
sent from those research efforts. 
It could be argued that the intent of all psy-
chological laboratory research is to isolate cer-
tain critical variables from the complications 
of real life, and that our conclusions are always 
tempered by an implied “all other things being 
equal.” This is a justifi able approach, but it re-
quires that when we interpret the signifi cance 
of our fi ndings for the real world, we tem-
per them with the qualifi cations that they have 
come from relatively artifi cial and contrived sit-
uations. This tempering has not been applied to 
the belief theory research. The belief theory re-
searchers, having investigated prejudice from 
few limited paradigms, have stacked the exper-
imental deck to prove that belief differences ac-
count for it all. The two experiments presented 
in this paper are an attempt to demonstrate how 
one might “unstack” such experiments by us-
ing belief information which is very relevant to 
race, by presenting that information in a more 
real-life-like context, and by using dependent 
measures which provide abroad range of prej-
udice indexes. Even when all this is done, of 
course, it is still illogical to try to assess the rel-
ative infl uence of race and belief. 
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The hypothesis underlying the research of 
this paper is simply that it is not possible to 
consider realistic and racially relevant belief 
manipulations to be independent of the race 
manipulations; these two types of variables are, 
when realistically presented, interactive. And 
that interaction is extremely (perhaps hopeless-
ly) complex. As information is received, the de-
gree it will be differentially interpreted by dif-
ferent listeners will depend on the manner of 
information presentation (is interpretation pos-
sible, or is a checklist of attitudes provided), the 
specifi c nature of the information (does the lis-
tener have race-relevant preconceptions con-
cerning this specifi c topic), the salience of the 
race differences (did the term “Negro” appear 
on a form, or has one seen the individual or 
heard his voice), and the prejudice level of the 
listener. The research discussed in this paper 
was designed to illustrate part of this complex-
ity-to demonstrate that a communicator’s race 
and communicated information do interact, or 
that the manipulation of race infl uences the in-
terpretation of information. 
Consider again the research which has been 
applied to the question of race versus belief. 
The two paradigms which have I tended to 
consistently support the belief theory (the 
simple statements of Rokeach et al., 1960, 
and the attitude checklist technique originat-
ed by Byrne & Wong, 1962) both used be-
lief presentation techniques which permitted 
the subjects very limited latitude for inter-
pretation. Had that information been present-
ed in a more life-like or equivocal form, it 
would have been I more possible for the sub-
jects’ race prejudices to have infl uenced their 
understanding, of interpretation of the infor-
mation, with the result that relatively great-
er proportions of the variance in those studies 
would have been contributed by race vari-
ables. The possibility that the results might 
be quite different when information presen-
tation techniques are different, perhaps more 
lifelike, will become more evident with the 
presentation of the data of this paper. 
RESEARCH SUPPORTING A MORE 
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP
These data were derived from two separate 
research efforts, the fi rst conducted with mid-
dle-class women in Rochester, New York, the 
second with university students in Lincoln, Ne-
braska. Although the fi rst study was a complex 
study concerning a variety of questions pertain-
ing to prejudice, only that portion of its data 
relevant to the present issue and to the Lincoln 
study is discussed. 
The hypothesis of the fi rst study was that if 
an individual were overheard talking about him-
self, and about his beliefs, the degree to which 
subjects would rate their beliefs as similar to 
the speaker’s would depend on both the appar-
ent race and class of the speaker. Since the re-
sults of that research infl uenced the development 
of the second study, a preview of the results of 
the fi rst is necessary here. While lower-class 
status of the communicator resulted in the sub-
jects’ seeing their views as being less similar to 
the communicator across most belief issues dis-
cussed, race had a much more variable effect, ob-
viously interacting with the specifi c belief issue, 
sometimes infl uencing the listener toward great-
er agreement with the black speaker (compared 
to the white communicator), but sometimes in-
fl uencing in the opposite direction. This fi nding, 
that agreement with the stimulus individual ap-
pears to result from an interaction of the specif-
ic belief issue with race, is similar to other fi nd-
ings (Dienstbier, 1970) that race interacts with 
the specifi c social-distance-type item used to as-
sess prejudice. Thus, either positive or negative 
bias might be evidenced by the same subject to-
ward a black stimulus individual, depending on 
the specifi c belief issue (as indicated by the pres-
ent research) or the specifi c prejudice measure. 
The specifi c fi nding from the fi rst study 
which inspired the second concerned the com-
municator’s discussion of integration. His very 
conservative statements (“I think it’s too ear-
ly for black people and white people to live to-
gether”) found greater subject agreement by 
the white subjects of that study if the speaker 
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were perceived as black than if white. The sec-
ond study was an attempt to determine whether 
more radical racial information (a black-pow-
er speech) would be more consistently threaten-
ing from a black than a white communicator. In 
the second study, as in the fi rst, the dependent 
measures indicated how similar the listener per-
ceived his own attitudes to those expressed by 
the racially labeled communicator. 
STUDY I
Method
Subjects. The 74 women who participated in this experiment 
were drawn from a women’s club for newcomers to the Roch-
ester area. Subjects were all white and generally from middle-
class backgrounds; most were between 25 and 40 years old. The 
subjects volunteered to participate in this research in return for 
the experience gained from such participation and for a lecture 
on sex from Vincent Nowlis. Subjects were randomly assigned 
to the four conditions of the experiment. 
Design and procedure. After being randomly assigned to 
one of four areas in a 360-seat auditorium, instructions were 
read to all four experimental groups simultaneously. Those in-
structions informed the subjects that they were to participate in 
two studies, one of the effect of “TV blurriness” on mood, the 
other concerning the evaluation of an (audio only) interview. 
The subjects were told that the person who was the subject 
of the silent video sequence was the same person whom they 
would subsequently hear interviewed. It was explained that it 
would be helpful to know what the interviewee looked like in 
order to be able to visualize him during the interview; since the 
video-blurriness study was to have been done anyway, the sub-
jects were told that it was time-saving for the experimenter and 
the subjects to have the interviewee in the video sequence. 
The subjects then fi lled out a Mood Adjective Check List 
(MACL: Nowlis, 1965), saw the one-minute video sequence 
which differed for each of the four groups, and fi lled out a 
second MACL. Curtains erected in the auditorium allowed 
subjects to see only the one TV set in front of their group. 
In all four video sequences the same actor was present-
ed, dressed, and made up to appear as either white or Ne-
gro, and of apparent middle-class or lower-class status. The 
race change involved grease paint and a neatly trimmed Afro 
wig. The social class change involved only a clothing change 
from suit to work clothes. A between-groups factorial design 
of Race × Class Status was thus effected, with each subject 
group seeing only one of the four TV sequences. Since the 
purpose of the video was only to effect the race and class 
manipulation, all four sequences were as identical in action 
as possible, consisting of a dull sequence of the man enter-
ing a room and sitting down. 
Since all the subjects in each group had been led to believe 
that they saw the same stimulus individual as had the other 
subject groups (the TV sequences supposedly differing only 
in blurriness), it was possible to present the same (audio only) 
tape-recorded interview of the stimulus individual to all sub-
jects simultaneously. The interview was presented as being a 
training interview of a male stimulus individual by a female 
counseling student. 
Pretests of the TV sequences on another population in-
dicated that the actor was adequately convincing as either a 
black or white man. (A great deal of selecting and pretest-
ing was required to fi nd a man whose voice was believable as 
black or white.) A postexperimental check on the suspicious-
ness of the subjects on that aspect of experimental credibility 
was also conducted. 
The interview lasted about 15 minutes, with topics dis-
cussed by the interviewee ranging from interpersonal rela-
tionships with family and friends to more abstract questions 
concerning political participation, crime, rioting, and integra-
tion. Generally, the interviewee was rather dull and negative. 
Following the interview, all subjects answered scaled items 
which pertained to the felt similarity of their beliefs to those 
expressed by the stimulus individual. The purpose of the sim-
ilarity items was to measure the subject’s felt similarity to the 
beliefs expressed by the interviewee. Subjects were asked to 
“Please rate the man who was interviewed, Mr. Jackson, on 
the similarity of his views to your own.” The instructions 
stressed that “In all cases, you will fi nd it possible to answer 
the questions from your memory of your impressions of the in-
terview you heard.” Sixteen concepts that had been discussed 
in the interview were rated, including occupational ambition 
and stability, marriage fi delity, cleanliness, honesty, loyalty to 
friends, adequacy of encouragement for his children, educa-
tional ambition, economic wisdom, political interest, reason-
ableness of advocated criminal punishment, balance of views 
on rioting and integration, and the degree to which he drank, 
was religious, and superstitious. Each concept was rated on a 
7-point scale with polar dimensions of “identical” and “oppo-
site.” Following the last of these scales, one scale asked the 
subjects to rate the overall similarity of their beliefs to those 
of the stimulus individual. 
Following written instructions on their use, 13 modi-
fi ed behavioral differential items (Triandis, 1964) represent-
ing factors of formal social acceptance, friendship acceptance, 
social distance, and subordination were included. These were 
presented in the same 7-point form previously described, with 
polar concepts of “would” and “would not.” 
The behavioral differential scales were followed by a 7-
item updated Ethnocentrism Scale (Adorno et al., 1950) tak-
en from the “Other Minorities and Patriotism” section of the 
“suggested fi nal form” of the Ethnocentrism Scale. Items 
were updated by changing references from “zoot-suiters” to 
“hippies,” from the League of Nations to the United Nations, 
and from the “secret of the atomic bomb” to “military rock-
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ets” Sections pertaining to ethnic minorities were not includ-
ed, since it was expected that some Jewish subjects would be 
participating and since not all subjects were exposed to Ne-
groes in the experiment, possibly resulting in differential sen-
sitization to Negro items. 
The last page of the questionnaire booklet concerned sus-
piciousness; subjects were asked questions ranging from gen-
eral ones of whether they noticed “anything special or unusual 
about the TV presentation” or about the interview, to specifi c 
items concerning the probable occupation of the interviewee 
and his race. Finally, subjects were asked to comment on the 
overall goals of the experiment as they saw them; a series of 
specifi c questions designed to detect suspiciousness of all crit-
ical aspects of the experiment followed. 
With the completion of the questionnaires by the subjects, 
the experiment was over. The major aims of the research and 
the necessity for the race and status deceptions were then ex-
plained to the subjects in an extended debriefi ng. 
Results
Of the 74 subjects who fi nished the experi-
ment, 18 were eliminated for suspiciousness of 
the race manipulation, gross misidentifi cation 
of the race of the stimulus individual, or the 
failure to follow instructions. 
Although subject attrition did not vary be-
tween conditions, the loss of subjects result-
ed in unequal numbers of subjects in the four 
conditions of the experiment and the analyses 
of variance which were performed on the scale 
data were of the unweighted means type (Mey-
ers, 1966). This design allowed the use of the 
data of all the subjects who were not eliminated 
for the reasons stated above. 
Generally, as indicated in Table 1, the hy-
potheses concerning the effect of perceived 
class status/on the effect of the belief material 
were confi rmed for 13 of the 16 belief issues (in 
direction of effect, but not statistically signifi -
cant), beliefs being rated more similar if attrib-
uted to the middle-class stimulus person. Statis-
tical signifi cance (p < .05) was found on four of 
those issues concerning ambition, occupational 
stability, loyalty to friends, and aspirations for 
children. A composite similarity score based on 
all 16 issues also showed a similar signifi cant 
class effect. All three scales which indicated a 
reverse from hypothesis were nonsignifi cant. 
Racial infl uences on belief similarity rat-
ings were not as consistent. In fact, 11 of the 
16 independent belief-topic items indicated a 
trend opposite to the hypothesis, with greater 
rated similarity in the communicator-Negro 
than in the communicator-white conditions. 
The F ratio of less than 1.0 for the composite 
(of all the belief-topic items) similarity score 
also refl ected the inconsistent race effect be-
tween the similarity scales. Of the three items 
which indicated statistical signifi cance based 
on the race variable, subjects agreed more 
with the white stimulus individual’s views 
concerning aspirations for his children, but 
more with the black individual’s views on in-
tegration and religion. Since the integration 
issue is of major importance for its implica-
tions for the second study of this paper, it will 
be emphasized here. 
The portion of the interview pertaining to 
the stimulus person’s views of prejudice was 
as follows : 
Stimulus individual: I think sometimes it’s too early for whites 
and blacks to live together. I don’t know—sometimes—
maybe it’s too early for that, for integration. 
Interviewer: But don’t you think we should try now, anyway? 
Stimulus person: Sometimes it seems like we shouldn’t, I 
don’t know. 
The mean rating of similarity if the stimulus 
person was black was 4.0, 2.7 if the person was 
white (based on a 7-point scale, the higher score 
indicating greater similarity). 
Of the 13 behavioral differential items used 
to assess social distance of the subject toward 
the stimulus person, some were sensitive to race 
alone (such as “Would exclude from my neigh-
borhood” and “Would accept as a close kin by 
marriage”), some to class alone (such as “Would 
treat as an equal,” and “Would admire the ideas 
of”) and one to both (“Would accept as a next-
door neighbor”). Some items were sensitive to 
neither race nor class. 
Finally, within-condition correlations of 
the Ethnocentrism Scale score for each sub-
ject with the subject’s composite similarity rat-
ings of the stimulus individual indicated that all 
such correlations were in the predicted direc-
tions, although not quite signifi cant at p < .05. 
Correlations of–.30,–.43,–.34, and .06 for com-
municator conditions of Negro lower class, Ne-
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gro middle class, white lower class, and white 
middle class, respectively, indicate that while 
subjects’ ethnocentrism tended to reduce felt 
similarity with the three “minority” communi-
cators, no such effect existed for the white-mid-
dle-class communicator. 
STUDY II
Method
Subjects. Subjects were 122 white male and female Uni-
versity of Nebraska basic psychology students who volun-
teered to participate in this study in order to partially fulfi ll an 
experimental participation requirement. 
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Design and procedure. Subjects were informed that the 
procedure was an attitude measurement technique and that 
they would hear a person discuss various topics on a tape; 
they were then to respond by indicating “how much you agree 
or disagree with the speaker, and how much you think you 
might like him. . . . this is really a survey of your own at-
titudes on the topics discussed in the tape.” Before the tape 
was played, all subjects were instructed to read part of a pro-
fessionally printed fl yer which was included in the question-
naire booklet announcing a “symposium on the black in white 
America.” It included one paragraph pertaining to the speaker 
whom the subjects were about to hear. 
The fl yer described preregistration procedures for the sym-
posium, listed the schedule of speakers, and gave a short one 
paragraph biographical sketch of three of the symposium 
speakers. The fl yer was the same for the four Race × Status 
manipulations except that the description of the second partic-
ipant varied. That critical paragraph was circled by hand, with 
the accompanying notation “read this section—this speak-
er will be heard on tape” hand written beside the paragraph. 
The paragraph, in its four variations, appears below. (Italics are 
presented here only to accentuate critical differences between 
paragraphs and were not included in the study manipulations.)
White lower class: Thursday, 11:00. Mr. Donald Lin-
dzey on “White Racism, Black Response.” Mr. Lindzey 
grew up in rural Arkansas where his family worked as 
sharecroppers. After reaching the eighth grade, he con-
tributed to the support of his family by working at odd 
jobs until joining in voter registration drives in Missis-
sippi from 1966 to 1968. Largely self-educated since 
then, Mr. Lindzey has been one of the few active white 
lecturers on the topic of black power during the last few 
years. His speaking has taken him throughout the United 
States, including the Deep South. 
White middle class: Thursday, 11:00. Mr. Donald Lin-
dzey on “White Racism, Black Response.” Mr. Lindzey 
grew up in a suburb of Little Rock, Arkansas. His father 
was a lawyer. He attended the University of Michigan 
for two years, majoring in sociology. He left Michigan 
in 1966 to participate for two years in voter registration 
drives in Mississippi. Mr. Lindzey has been one of the few 
active white lecturers on the topic of black power during 
the last few years. His speaking has taken him throughout 
the United States, including the Deep South. 
Black lower class: Thursday, 11:00. Mr. Howard 
Washington on “White Racism, Black Response.” Mr. 
Washington grew up in rural Arkansas where his family 
worked as sharecroppers. After reaching the eighth grade 
in an all black school, he contributed to the support of 
his family by working at odd jobs until joining in vot-
er registration in Mississippi from 1966 to 1968. Large-
ly self-educated since then, Mr. Washington has been ac-
tive in lecturing on the topic of black power during the 
last two years; His speaking has taken him throughout 
the United States, including the Deep South. 
Black middle class: Thursday, 11:00. Mr. How-
ard Washington on “White Racism, Black Response.” 
Mr. Washington grew up in a predominantly white sub-
urb of Little Rock, Arkansas, where his family was the 
only black family in the neighborhood. His father was a 
lawyer. He attended the University of Michigan for two 
years, majoring in sociology. He left Michigan in 1966 
to participate for two years in voter registration drives 
in Mississippi. Mr. Washington has been an active lec-
turer on the topic of black power during the last two 
years. His speaking has taken him throughout the United 
States, including the Deep South. 
That manipulation of communicator’s race and class status 
formed, with sex of subject, a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design. 
For this second study, two different tapes were made, 
one attributed to a black man named Howard Washington, 
the second to a white man named Donald Lindzey. Sever-
al factors prompted this change from Study I. First, it is ex-
tremely diffi cult to make a single sound tape which is equal-
ly convincing as that of a white or black speaker. Second, 
the introduction of vocal differences associated with race 
would increase the power of the race manipulation. It was 
felt that these considerations more than balanced the ad-
vantage of the clean experimental interpretation allowed by 
the single-tape manipulation. The procedure necessitated, 
of course, the running of two separate groups of subjects, 
each hearing only one of those two critical audiotapes. At-
tempts to eliminate any selection bias between those two 
groups included scheduling both sessions at a time in the 
late afternoon when classes were few, and running the two 
sessions with the second following immediately after the 
fi rst. Within each group, subjects of both sexes were ran-
domly assigned to the status conditions. Strenuous attempts 
were made to equate the two audiotapes on overall quali-
ty and emphasis. Specifi cally, although the verbal message 
was quite controversial, both speakers maintained a calm 
and paced delivery; this seemed appropriate in view of the 
fact that the speech was supposedly delivered and recorded 
at a university symposium. 
The opinions on which subject agreement was assessed 
had all been pretested (the previous semester) in written form 
for agreement with an independent sample of basic psychol-
ogy students. It was thus ascertained that a fairly wide rage 
of statement acceptability was achieved. (Agreement ranged 
from 4.95 to 2.28, respectively, on a 7-point belief similarity 
scale from “identical” to “opposite” for items of “Black peo-
ple do not want to move in with white people” and “Half of 
every tax dollar from white people should go to support black 
education, black social services, and black culture.”) 
The tape recording lasted approximately fi ve minutes, 
though subjects were left with the impression that it was only 
the fi rst part of the communicator’s speech which was played 
for them. Unlike Study I, the topics of the speech were re-
stricted to issues of the black minority in a white culture. The 
range of topics can be seen by the item headings on the fi rst 
seven items of Table 2. 
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After the tape was played, subjects were instructed to turn 
to the page in the questionnaire booklets which contained the 
scaled items related to the speech. Instructions for the opin-
ion similarity rating told subjects to “rate the similarity of your 
own views to his views on the following topics. Base your rat-
ings on what you heard Mr. Washington [or Mr. Lindzey] say 
on the tape recording.” Ratings were made on the same Lykert-
type 7-point scales with polar adjectives of “identical” and 
“opposite” which were used in the pretest for Study II and in 
Study I. The last of those scales asked subjects for a rating of 
the general similarity of their values to those of the speaker. 
Finally, fi ve social distance and behavioral differen-
tial scales similar to some of those used in Study I were em-
ployed, with instructions to the subjects to “assume that you 
had the opportunity to interact with him in the manner sug-
gested by the question” in responding to those items. Those 
scales form the last fi ve items of Table 2. 
After fi lling out that form, subjects were given a question-
naire meant to assess suspiciousness concerning any decep-
tion in the study. The form explained that subjects often “form 
their Own explanations or hypotheses about what the exper-
imenter is ‘really’ after,” and asked a series of open-ended 
questions about what suspicions the subject had formed, how 
certain he was of those suspicions, etc. 
Subjects were debriefed concerning the true nature and 
purpose of the experiment. 
Results
Of the 122 subjects who took part in the ex-
periment, two were eliminated for suspicious-
ness that the tape recordings were not real. Sub-
jects were randomly eliminated from seven of 
the eight cells of the analysis of variance design 
to achieve an equal number of subjects per cell, 
bringing the number of subjects used in the anal-
yses to 88 (there being 11 subjects in the small-
est cell). It was felt that the rather large num-
ber of subjects still in the design would provide 
an accurate assessment of the independent vari-
able effects without necessitating the unweight-
ed-means-type analysis used in Study I. 
Table 2 presents the major results of Study 
II. Results of communicator variables by sub-
ject sex are not included in that table since sex 
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was never a signifi cant interactive variable 
with race or class. On 12 of the 13 similarity 
and social distance variables, women subjects 
tended to be more accepting and to see their 
beliefs as more similar to the communicator’s 
reversing only on the issue of election to polit-
ical offi ce. The only statistically signifi cant ef-
fects related to sex were for the liking-if-met 
item (mean liking by women = 4.20 compared 
to 3.41 for men, F = 4.61, df = 1/80, p < .05) 
and the accept-as-kin item (mean acceptance 
by women = 4.30 compared to 3.41 for men, F 
= 4.51, df = 1/80, p < .05). 
Unlike Study I, in which status seemed the 
most consistently reliable determinant of agree-
ment variance (the communication in Study 1. 
did not largely concern race-relevant issues), 
the results of Study II indicated that commu-
nicator’s race was the single most powerful in-
fl uence on variance for the similarity and social 
distance scales. That fi nding is indicated strong-
ly by greater agreement with and liking for 
the white communicator in everyone of the 13 
scales used in Study II. This race effect is sig-
nifi cant for three of the eight similarity scales 
(including the general similarity item), and for 
all fi ve of the social-distance-type measures. 
Although the direction of the status differ-
ences were consistent with those of Study I, 
with the middle-class communicator receiving 
more favorable ratings on 12 of the 13 depen-
dent measure scales, the differences are not sta-
tistically signifi cant on any measure. 
Finally, there are no statistically signifi cant 
Race × Class interactions. 
DISCUSSION OF THE DATA
Between Study I and Study II, differences 
existed (a) in the manner in which independent 
variables of race and status were manipulated, 
(b) in the content and style of communication 
delivery, (c) in some of the dependent measure 
scales, and (d) in the characteristics of the sub-
ject populations used. Yet, if the fi ndings of the 
two studies are broadly considered, it is possi-
ble to compare and contrast those fi ndings. 
Across both studies, the manipulation of so-
cial class status resulted in subjects rating their 
beliefs as less similar to the lower-class com-
municator, compared to the middle-class com-
municator. The topics discussed in the two 
scripts of the two studies did not, of course, 
exhaust possible and likely topic areas, and 
in Study II, while the script was purposefully 
made race relevant, no such effort was made 
for relevancy to social class. Therefore, de-
spite the consistency of the class fi ndings, it is 
expected that one could fi nd topics for such re-
search presentations with which even middle-
class subjects would fi nd more agreement with 
the lower-class communicator. 
Within Study I, communicator race and com-
munication topic interacted, so that some issues 
induced more agreement with the white com-
municator, while others resulted in the black re-
ceiving more agreement. The complexity of the 
interactions between communicator character-
istics and communication content is, therefore, 
more evident with respect to race than class 
variables. By restricting the range of the topics 
used in Study II to a single class of race-rele-
vant issues, it was predicted that the irregular 
race-topic interaction found in Study I would 
give way to a consistent unidirectional race ef-
fect; this was realized in Study II as the consis-
tent tendency to agree more with (and to like 
more) the white communicator. 
Taken together, the two studies illustrate 
that expectations which subjects have about 
class are different from those about race, and 
that a communication which is relevant to 
class and/or race, and which is presented in a 
fashion which permits interpretation latitude, 
interacts in unique ways with those variables. 
It is apparent from Study I that these interac-
tions between information content and com-
municator-characteristic variables are mediat-
ed by subject characteristics associated with 
expectencies, sets, or stereotypes relevant to 
those communicator characteristics; this rela-
tionship was illustrated by the pattern of corre-
lations between subject ethnocentrism and felt 
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similarity toward the communicator. It is also 
evident, particularly from the results of Study 
I, that no simple formulation such as suggested 
by congruity theory (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 
1955) based only on the I valences of the com-
municator and the communication could ac-
count for the complex ways in which com-
munication and communicator characteristics 
interact. As illustrated by the behavioral dif-
ferential and social distance measures of both 
studies of this paper (as well as by Dienstbier, 
1970; Triandis, 1961; Triandis & Davis, 1965), 
the degree to which prejudice would be indi-
cated as due to status or race would depend on 
the dependent measures used to operationalize 
that construct. It is diffi cult to avoid the sus-
picion that some circularity has crept into the 
(reviewed) belief theory literature with respect 
to the choice of dependent measures. Preju-
dice has often been operationally defi ned by 
some dependent measures which have proven 
to be more sensitive to the belief manipulation 
than the race manipulation. to suggest, as did 
Mezei (1971), that a more race-sensitive mea-
sure is unfair since it would be related to and 
confounded with perceived social pressure is 
on the one hand admitting the complexity of 
prejudice, while on the other denying the im-
portance of that complexity since it does not 
fi t the simpler belief theory. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR A REVISED 
BELIEF THEORY
The belief theory of prejudice suggests that 
when we perceive an individual to be black, 
then we make assumptions about his different 
beliefs—it is these assumptions which account 
for our negative feelings and our discriminatory 
actions toward that individual. Not spelled out 
in this formulation, but seemingly obvious, is 
the stipulation that the belief areas about which 
assumptions are made will be relevant to the in-
dividual’s race, or our stereotype of it. If we see 
a black person we will not necessarily assume 
that he is a communist, or an anarchist, or that 
be believes anecdotal evidence is more valuable 
than experimental psychology in providing reli-
able information. Rather, the belief dimensions 
upon which we might base our discrimination 
would be relevant to our stereotypes about in-
dividuals of that race, and would, therefore, be 
solidly in the areas about which we anticipate 
nonconsensus with those individuals. It makes 
little sense, then, to attempt to demonstrate that 
racial differences of stimulus individuals have 
little power to infl uence us when those stimulus 
individuals are equated on a host of irrelevant 
beliefs (as has been done so often in the cited 
belief theory literature). This exercise can only 
show us that race is not interactive with those 
belief issues, and that subjects are reluctant to 
respond negatively toward a racially labeled 
stimulus person without some justifi cation or 
that they have no racial prejudice to begin with 
(or are reluctant to show it), or that they are 
making unwarranted assumptions about what 
they should respond to, or that they do not be-
lieve the experimenter. 
It is apparent that the theoretical and exper-
imental considerations are (or should be) more 
complex than suggested by the unidirection-
al conceptualizations of the belief theory re-
searchers. The attempt to account for complex 
constructs like prejudice on the basis of a sin-
gle underlying principle cannot succeed. This 
pattern of theory construction represents a way 
of conceptualizing human behavior whose roots 
lie plainly in an oversimplistic view of man. 
It may indeed be true (and quite apparent-
ly is so) that one’s assumption that another in-
dividual will not validate one’s belief systems 
will dispose one negatively toward that per-
son. But it is equally true, as evidenced by the 
present research; that when the belief informa-
tion is relevant to racial issues, those assump-
tions of dissimilar beliefs are not always simply 
and quickly allayed by the presentation of be-
lief information. It appears from this data that 
assumptions about belief differences are caused 
by prejudice (read antipathy or negative affect) 
just as it is also apparent from the belief theo-
ry research that prejudice is caused by assump-
tions about belief differences. In the fi rst case 
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the negative affect may exist for any number of 
reasons, as indicated by Allport (1954) and dis-
cussed in the introduction to this paper. We are 
not left with a choice between either race (i.e., 
responses to race not based on belief issues) or 
belief to account for prejudice. There may in-
deed be times when a greater reliance on one 
or the other of those constructs may provide us 
greater success in the prediction, understand-
ing, and control of certain behaviors, but these 
are concepts so different in structure that they 
can neither be logically compared for relative 
strength nor can they be heuristically seen as 
hierarchically arranged. They hold, instead, re-
lationships with each other most fruitfully seen 
as mutually causal or interactive. To lose sight 
of this mutual causation is to oversimplify the 
area of prejudice, with the ultimate result that 
our laboratory studies will have less and less 
relevance for the real world. 
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